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Abstract
Background: A major concern by the health decision makers in Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) countries is the
burden of financing healthcare. While other GCC countries have been examining different options, Saudi Arabia has
endeavoured to reform its private healthcare system and control expatriate access to government resources through
the provision of Compulsory Employment-Based Health Insurance (CEBHI). The objective of this research was to
investigate, in a natural setting, the characteristics of uninsured expatriates based on their personal and workplace
characteristics.
Methods: Using a cross-sectional survey, data were collected from a sample of 4,575 male expatriate employees using
a multi-stage stratified cluster sampling technique. Descriptive statistics were used to summarize all variables, and the
dependent variable was tabulated by access to health insurance and tested using Chi-square. Logistic analysis was
performed, guided by the conceptual model.
Results: Of survey respondents, 30% were either uninsured or not yet enrolled in a health insurance scheme, 79.4% of
these uninsured expatriates did not have valid reasons for being uninsured, with Iqama renewal accounting for 20.6%
of the uninsured. The study found both personal and workplace characteristics were important factors influencing
health insurance status. Compared with single expatriates, married expatriates (accompanied by their families) are 30%
less likely to be uninsured. Moreover, workers occupying technical jobs requiring high school level of education or
above were two-thirds more likely to be insured compared to unskilled workers. With regard to firm size, respondents
employed in large companies (more than 50 employees) are more likely to be insured compared to those employed in
small companies (less than ten employees). In relation to business type, the study found that compared to workers
from the agricultural sector, industrial/manufacturing, construction and trading sectors, workers were, respectively, 76%,
85%, and 60% less likely to be uninsured.
Conclusion: Although the CEBHI is mandatory, this study found that the characteristics of uninsured expatriates, in
respect of their personal and workplace characteristics have similarities with the uninsured from other private
employment-sponsored health insurance schemes. Other factors influencing access to health insurance, besides
employee and workplace characteristics, include the development and extent of the country’s insurance industry.
Keywords: Health insurance, Saudi health insurance, Minorities and access to health insurance, Expatriates health
insurance, Uninsured characteristics
* Correspondence: aalkhamis@seu.edu.sa
1Saudi Electronic University, Abu Baker Al Sedge Rd, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© The Author(s). 2017 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Alkhamis et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2017) 17:56 
DOI 10.1186/s12913-017-1985-x
Background
A particular concern posed by the scale of expatriate
populations in Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) countries
is the burden of financing healthcare. Saudi Arabia, as
with other GCC countries, has a dominant expatriate
worker population as 90% of private sector workers are
expatriates [1]. As a percentage of the total labour force,
the expatriate1 percentage share in the Kingdom of
Bahrain is 61.9%, Kuwait 84.8%, Oman 64.3%, Qatar
81.6%, UAE 89.8%, and Saudi Arabia 55.8% [2]. The
healthcare financing systems in GCC countries are still be-
ing developed. At present, financing for most of their pub-
lic services, including healthcare services, is through
revenue from natural resources (i.e. oil or gas) [3]. Saudi
Arabia, however, has attempted to reform its private
healthcare system and reduce expatriate access to govern-
ment resources through the provision of the Compulsory
Employment-Based Health Insurance (CEBHI). At the
same time, other GCC countries have been looking at
various options for financing their healthcare services [3],
but have yet to identify or implement an approach enab-
ling them to reduce the burden of healthcare expenditure
imposed by their expatriate worker populations and are at
the stage of trying to learn lessons from one another’s
experiences [4–8].
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD) distinguishes public from private in-
surance by the source of funds [9]. Private health
insurance is often characterized as voluntary for-profit
commercial coverage in contrast to mandatory, publicly
financed and publicly managed insurance. Ultimately, all
money comes from household or employer income, but
in public insurance programs, this money is channelled
through the state via general or social insurance tax,
whereas the money is paid directly to the risk pooling
entity in private insurance [10, 11]. The CEBHI shares
the nature of its health plan with public insurance
(mandatory) and shares the source of funds with private
health insurance.
The phasing of the CEBHI was carried out according
to the size of the firm, as with the implementation of the
Korean social health insurance [12]. Health insurance in
the form of the CEBHI was introduced in Saudi Arabia
in 1999, but the actual implementation began on July 15,
2006, for large companies with more than 6000 em-
ployees; in September of the same year companies with
more than 500 employees were included. However, the
full implementation to all companies regardless of their
size started on November 9, 2008. After this date, there
are some expatriates who were not insured because the
implementation occurred at the time for their resident
permit renewal, which was not due for renewal at the
time of the study. Moreover, the family members of ex-
patriate employees who worked in a firm with more than
900 employees had to be covered by 10 May 2009. The
timing of the study was critical because it fell after the
implementation of the CEBHI for all expatriates, regard-
less of their employer’s size but did not include all the
expatriates' family members.
Before the implementation of the CEBHI, the scope of
medical coverage varied from one employer to another,
while some employers provided full coverage - by either
cash through insurers or via full reimbursement - others
did not pay anything. Hence, there was no mechanism
or clear method as to how the CEBHI regulations should
be implemented; so although some expatriates could
afford to pay for medical services, others on low in-
comes were rendered vulnerable to the cost of illness,
due to the lack of basic healthcare and difficulty in
affording out of pocket payments [13]. However, follow-
ing the initial implementation of the CEBHI, it was
made mandatory for all employers to participate in the
scheme. The Council of The Cooperative Health Insur-
ance (CCHI) determines the unified benefits package.
The CCHI is the government body responsible for regu-
lating and monitoring the universality of health insur-
ance coverage [14]. Thus, all necessary examinations,
treatment, medication, diagnoses and preventive proce-
dures have been unified in the one insurance policy (see
Table 1). For example, expatriate employees’ maximum
co-payments are pre-determined so as not to exceed
20% of the invoice or a maximum of SR100 (USD26.67)
[14]. Also, no co-insurance/deduction for inpatients ser-
vice is permitted. Moreover, the unified plan covers up
to $ 533.3 for dental treatments.2
The insurance market in Saudi Arabia was developed
in 2003. Before this, because there was opposition from
some Islamic scholars, the relationship between healthcare
providers and insurance was ungoverned and unsuper-
vised [3]. They contended that in Islam, commercial insur-
ance should not be permitted; but cooperative health
insurance and not-for-profit health insurance are permis-
sible. The Saudi Arabia constitution is based on the Holy
Quran and Sunnah (Prophet Mohammed’s recorded say-
ing), and the health insurance scheme must be linked to
the constitution of the country. The term "cooperative
health insurance" has been used for the CEBHI so that the
required legislation is passed. However, the characteristics
of cooperative health insurance do not equate with the
CEBHI because the current practice is for premiums to go
back to the insurance company owner as oppose to benefi-
ciaries of the services [15].
The CEBHI scheme was implemented in Saudi Arabia
to benefit expatriate workers in the private sector, with
the multiple aims of regulating the provision of health-
care for expatriates (while providing financial protection
against their healthcare expenses), improving utilisation
of the government healthcare budget, by reducing the
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load on government healthcare providers, and increasing
the contribution of private healthcare sector expenditure
[16–18]. Indeed, according to Saudi Labour Law, em-
ployers must bear the responsibility for paying all neces-
sary medical expenses for their expatriate employees [19].
The CEBHI scheme in Saudi Arabia differs from other
forms of employer-sponsored insurance (ESI). In particu-
lar, the CEBHI scheme is compulsory, with enforcement
including financial fines to be paid by employers who fail
to follow the policy [14]. Moreover, expatriate workers in
Saudi Arabia are unable to obtain or renew their Iqama
(residency permit) without an official document confirm-
ing health insurance coverage for the same duration of the
Iqama [14]. Also, it is not permitted for a health insurance
company to reject any application for cooperative health
insurance [18]. In other words, health insurance with the
CEBHI is an obligation under Saudi labour law and not an
employment fringe benefit. This situation contrasts with a
system of voluntary employment insurance, whereby em-
ployers control both the eligibility criteria (employment
status and hours worked) and who is to be offered health
insurance [20]. The financial burden under ESI is largely
carried by workers and their dependents, with health
insurance coverage, benefits, premiums and co-payments
based on an agreement between the employer and the
health insurance company [21]. By implication, employees
could face an increase in the premium or the co-payment,
or see a reduction in the healthcare benefits of the policy.
However, under the CEBHI, employers must pay the en-
tire premium for their workers [14]. The CEBHI scheme
is such that if employers do not subscribe or fail to pay
the premiums of their employees, then the employer
would be required to pay the premiums and a limited fine,
along with losing the right to employ expatriate workers
[18]. In effect, the CEBHI protects employees from the
prospect of increasing costs of premiums over time; this is
the opposite of the situation in, for example, the private
sector in the United States, where employers are shifting
the cost to their employees [22].
In summary, because of its mandatory nature and the
control and regulation of financial barriers by the govern-
ment, in theory at least, the CEBHI promises to guarantee
access to health insurance for expatriate workers. On the
other hand, the insurance sector is not well developed in
Saudi Arabia since it was only established in 2003. This
factor might reflect some reports which stated that
Table 1 Cooperative health insurance schedulea [67]
Policy coverage Maximum benefit limit/person Covered treatments/procedures
Maximum Benefit Limit/Person SR 250,000
Outpatient Treatment Expenses
- Co-insurance/Deduction
0-20% per visit,
Max. of
SR 100 per visit
Consultations, lab tests, x-rays, medicines, medicines
and other medical necessities, follow-up visits and
referrals for the same illness
Physician's Fees:
General Practitioner SR 50
Specialist SR 100
Consultant SR 150
Rare medical specialties SR 250 Cardiology, brain and neurological surgery, vascular
surgery, and other sub-specialties per standards of
Saudi Commission for Health Specialties
Hospitalisation Expenses/Fees:
Co-insurance/Deduction None
Accommodation for the patient SR 600/day
Accommodation for the hospital sitter SR 150/day
Pregnancy/Delivery Cost for married beneficiaries SR 150,000 Shared Room (includes charges for bed, nursing,
medical visits, supervision, and catering services)
Premature Babies As per terms and conditions
of the policy
Shared Room
Cost of Dental Treatment SR 2,000
Cost of Spectacles SR 200
Cost of Renal Dialysis SR 10,000
Cost of Acute Psychological Disorders SR 15,000
Corpse Repatriation to Home Country SR 10,000
aThe table was amended on 4/2/2014 [68]
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employers pay insurers under the table without the
employees having insurance to secure the renewal of
employee residency permits [23]. However, there is
little evidence on the performance of various forms of
private health insurance in developing countries [24],
nor is there any literature that evaluates the role of
private employment-based health insurance in devel-
oping countries [25]. The objective of this paper is to
investigate, in a natural ‘quasi-experimental’ setting:
the characteristics of uninsured expatriates bases on
their personal and workplace characteristics. It is an-
ticipated that by drawing on Saudi Arabia’s experience
of implementing the CEBHI throughout the entire
country, this study will assist other GCC countries in
reforming their systems of healthcare financing.
Method
Using a cross-sectional survey, data were collected from
a sample of 4,575 male expatriates. Riyadh City, the cap-
ital of Saudi Arabia, was selected as the setting for the
study because the Riyadh region contains more than
one-third of expatriates and one-fourth of the Saudi
population [26]. A multi-stage stratified cluster sampling
technique was used for the employee population. The
businesses/companies of participants were identified
from the Ministry of Labour database and stratified
based on business type, company size and number of
employees. Based on their size and economic sector,
companies were randomly selected from the database.
During randomization facilitated through the Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software, compan-
ies’ names and any related information were concealed;
the only means of identification was the company’s
code number, known only to the Manager, Statistics
Department at the Ministry of Labour.
Descriptive statistics were used to summarize all vari-
ables. Frequencies and percentages were calculated for the
categorical variables. Mean and standard deviation values
were calculated for quantitative variables. Whether people
were insured or not insured was the main dependent vari-
able - a binary variable. The dependent variable was tested
using Chi-square and tabulated by access to health insur-
ance. Logistic regression analysis was performed as guided
by the conceptual model (Fig. 1). The main independent
variables were based on either workplace or personal char-
acteristics, as illustrated in Fig. 1. This analysis was used
to determine the main personal and workplace character-
istics of those who were not insured. The measure of asso-
ciation in the logistic regression was the odds ratio and its
95% confidence interval. The data collection period was
from 22 May to 6 December 2010. A double data entry
system was employed to minimize errors. Frequency ana-
lysis of all variables in the final data set was undertaken
and all outliers were checked by revisiting the survey an-
swers for clarification. For all of the analyses a p-value of
less than 0.05 was considered significant.
The Dependent Variables
The main dependent variable was whether or not ex-
patriate male workers in the private sector had health
insurance under the CEBHI scheme. This study did
not measure access to health insurance based on
workers having health insurance or not (as an abso-
lute value). Accordingly, people were considered ‘in-
sured’ if they had health insurance for a minimum of
one year, the reason being that there is evidence that
employers provide health insurance for a very limited
period to enable acquisition of residency visa renewal
[23]. Therefore, two groups were excluded from being
considered insured. Firstly, those who were insured
for a limited time, such as three months to get their
residency visa renewal, but afterwards were not in-
sured. Secondly, those who have been insured for less
than one year were excluded from being considered
Fig. 1 Conceptual Framework in Identifying Personal and Workplace Characteristics
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insured. This group was excluded because we do not
know if they will construe to be insured or not and
their share of the total is small (3.3%).
The study participants were asked: ‘Have you had health
insurance for at least 12 months continuously?’ For partic-
ipants answering ‘No’ we provided the following options:
1) ‘My health insurance policy was valid for less than one
year’; 2) ‘I am not sponsored by my company’; 3) ‘My visa
is for a different job’; 4) ‘I have not renewed my Iqama’; 5)
‘I have been insured, but for less than one year’; 6) ‘I was
insured for a specified length of time’, with a space pro-
vided to record the period of insurance; and 7) ‘Another
reason’, with space for explanation.
Independent Variables
As the research was focused on access to health insur-
ance, the factors affecting expatriates’ access have been
re-classified into personal characteristics and work-
place characteristics (Tables 2 and 3). The socio-
economic factors included in the questionnaire were
based on Andersen’s Behaviour Model (1995). Socio-
economic factors included were the worker’s date of
birth, nationality, highest education level attained
(illiterate, can read and write, completed elementary,
completed high school, completed a diploma, a bache-
lor’s degree, a master’s degree, or doctoral studies),
marital status (single or married; either married and
with family living outside Saudi Arabia, or married
with family living in Saudi Arabia), monthly income,
comfort of the participant conversing in Arabic or
English, adapted from the Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey (MEPS) [27], and general questions assessing
health status. Also, the questionnaire asked respon-
dents to rate general health as being excellent, very
good, good, fair or poor.
Workplace characteristic variables included com-
pany size, job education requirements, and economic
sector. The economic sector/industry classification
was based on the third revision of the International
Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) of all eco-
nomic activities, which has been used to standardise
the collection and reporting of statistics [28]. Each
participant in the study was asked the question: ‘What
is your position in your company?’ Based on the an-
swer, the position of the participant in the company
was classified according to the Ministry of Labour
classifications [28]. This system was used to determine
the education requirements of the job. Most expatri-
ates in Saudi Arabia are overqualified for the jobs in
which they are employed [29]. This study has adopted
the Ministry of Labour classifications to enable segre-
gation of personal characteristics (such as a worker’s
education level) and workplace characteristics (the
education requirements of the job).
Results
Descriptive Analysis
The main personal and workplace characteristics of the
expatriate population are presented in Tables 2 and 3.
Table 2 presents the personal characteristics of the survey
Table 2 Personal characteristics of respondents in the study
(n = 4575)
Frequency Percent
Nationality Non-Arab 3117 68.1
Arab 1458 31.9
Nationalities India 1100 24.0
Bangladesh 1159 25.3
Pakistan 819 17.9
Egypt 498 10.9
Philippines 200 4.4
Yemen 234 5.1
Other Arab 404 8.8
Asian 136 3.0
Other Nationalities 25 0.6
Can speak: (not
mutually exclusive)
English 2403 52.5
Arabic 4119 90.0
Coded Mother
language
Arabic 1480 32.3
Non-Arabic 3095 67.7
Marital status Single/Divorced 842 18.4
Married with
accompanying family
750 16.4
Married without
accompanying family
2983 65.2
Age <30 1006 22.0
30-39 1895 41.4
40-49 1289 28.2
50-59 338 7.4
≥60 47 1.0
Median (Range) 36 (15.0-85.0)
Mean ± SD 36 ± 8.7
Education Illiterate 66 1.4
Read/write 239 5.2
Primary 1026 22.4
Intermediate/secondary 1654 36.2
Diploma 351 7.7
Bachelor 1127 24.6
Master & Doctorate 112 2.4
Monthly salary
without allowance
(SR)
≤2000 3085 67.4
2001-4500 1186 25.9
4501-6000 156 3.4
6001-9000 97 2.1
>9000 51 1.1
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respondents. The median age of expatriate workers in the
private sector was 36 years. More than half (68.1%) of the
expatriates working in the private sector were non-Arabs.
Although two-thirds (67.7%) reported non-Arabic lan-
guage as their mother tongue, the majority (90.0%) of the
respondents can speak Arabic and more than half of the
expatriates can speak English. Around two-thirds (67.4%)
of respondents were classified as low-income earners, with
less than SR2, 000 per month, excluding allowances. Add-
itionally, just less than two-thirds (65.2%) of expatriate
workers reported that they are married, although their
families were not living with them in Saudi Arabia.
Table 3 presents the job and employer characteristics in
which the respondents are employed. The findings show
that the trading and construction sectors employed the
highest proportion of expatriate workers, as more than
half of the respondents were employed in these industries.
One-third (33.9%) held jobs categorized for unskilled
workers, usually requiring no education, whereas the re-
spondents’ education levels revealed that less than 7.0%
were illiterate or barely able to read and write. Although
60.0% of the companies randomly identified for the study
employed more than 50 employees, there was a vast differ-
ence regarding employee numbers in the companies, ran-
ging from three to 40,000 employees (with a mean of just
over 800 employees and a median of 80 employees).
As can be seen in Table 4, 30% of survey respondents
were either uninsured or not enrolled in a health insur-
ance program. Moreover, 79.4% of respondents did not
have valid reasons for being uninsured, while 20.6% of
expatriate workers reported a valid and legal reason for
not being given health insurance coverage. Specifically,
that their Iqama was not due for renewal at the time of
the survey being administered (Table 4). Enrolment in a
health insurance program is undertaken only upon
renewal of the Iqama. Also, a small percentage of the
sample (3.3%) was excluded due to their being insured
for less than one year.
The Main Personal and Workplace Characteristics of
Uninsured Expatriates Using Logistic Analysis
Marital Status
Marital status was grouped into three classes: single (ref-
erence group), married with family living with them, and
married but their families are not living with them, as
can be found in Table 5. Compared with single expatri-
ates, married expatriates (accompanied by their families)
are almost 30% less likely to be uninsured, (OR = 0.71,
95% CI 0.96-0.53). No significant statistical difference
was found between single workers and married workers
whose families are not with them in the Kingdom.
Table 4 Health insurance coverage and reasons for not being
insured
Health insurance status: Frequency Percent
0-None 1371 30.0
1-Yes for more than 12 monthsa 3053 66.7
2-Yes for less than 12 monthsb 151 3.3
Reason for not having health insurance (N = 1371):
1-Had insurance but endedc 219 16.0
2-Sponisered by different employer 291 21.2
3-Visa was for another jobd 148 10.8
4- I have not renewed my Iqamae 283 20.6
5-Insurance was done only to renew Iqama 375 27.4
6-Others (e.g. unaware of the CEBHI scheme) 55 4.0
aInsured continuously for more than one year
bInsured but did not complete a year (some people were insured for only one
or two months to secure iqama renewal)
cThe insurance of this group was terminated (some of this group were only
insured for one or two months to pass the iqama newly). But when the study
was conducted, they were not insured
dDomestic jobs (e.g. housemaid) are excluded from the CEBHI scheme and so
insurance is not needed for Iqama renewal
eBecause the study occurred less than two-years from full implementation of
the CEBHI, for some expatriate workers the Iqama was not due for renewal
and so they were not insured
Table 3 The workplace characteristics of respondents in the
study (n = 4575)
Frequency Percent
Type of industry Agriculture 115 2.5
Mining/quarrying 78 1.7
Industrial 644 14.1
Water and power 100 2.2
Construction 905 19.8
Trade 1467 32.1
Transportation 242 5.3
Financial/business 184 4.0
Education and Training 692 15.1
Other 148 3.2
Number of
employees in
the company
<10 725 15.8
10-24 534 11.7
25-50 548 12.0
>50 2768 60.5
Median (Range) 80 (3–40000)
Mean ± SD 819.5 ± 3284.7
Education
requirements
of the job
Specialist with university
education
1009 22.1
Professional with education
higher than high school
247 5.4
Technical with high school
education
1033 22.6
Manual worker with less
than high school education
734 16.0
Unskilled usually with no
education
1552 33.9
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Education Job Requirement
As outlined in Table 5, the higher the job education
requirements and the lower the occurrence of being
insured. Workers who had technical jobs requiring
high school level education were two-thirds less likely
to be uninsured compared to unskilled workers in em-
ployment with no education required (OR = 0.349, 95%
CI 0.223-0.544). Compared with unskilled workers
with no education, jobs requiring specialists with uni-
versity education and professionals with higher than
high school level education had approximately 70% less
risk of being uninsured (OR = 0.29, 95% CI 0.18- 0.45).
There were no statistically significant differences in the
risk of being uninsured between unskilled jobs and
jobs that required manual skills with less than high
school education.
Number of Employees in the Company
Respondents employed in large companies (more than
fifty employees) are two-thirds less likely to be unin-
sured, compared to those who are employed in small
companies (less than ten employees). There was no sta-
tistically significant difference in insurance status be-
tween companies with less than ten employees and
employers with less than twenty-five employees or fewer
than fifty employees (see Table 5).
Economic Sector / Business Type
Compared to workers from the agriculture sector, indus-
trial/manufacturing sector workers were 76% less likely
to be insured (see Table 5). Construction sector workers
were 85% less likely to be uninsured, compared to agri-
culture sector workers. Workers from the trading sector
were 58% likely to be uninsured compared to agriculture
sector workers. Workers from other sectors (combined)
were statistically insignificant in having access to insur-
ance as compared to agriculture sector workers.
Income Category
As can be found in Table 5, workers who earned more
than SR 4,500 (but not more than SR 6,000) per month
were around 10% less likely to be uninsured compared
to workers who earned SR 2,000 or less per month.
Compared to low-income earners (SR 2,000 or less),
workers earning more than SR 6,000 (but not greater
than SR 9,000) per month, reported being around one-
third less likely to be uninsured. Workers who earned
more than SR 9,000 per month were 75% less likely to
be uninsured compared to low-income earners. No sta-
tistically significant difference was found between
workers who earned SR 2,000 or less per month and
those who earned greater than SR 2,000 (but not more
than SR 45,000) per month.
Discussion
There are similarities between the study sample and
the expatriate population in Saudi Arabia. For ex-
ample, the average age of the study population and
the expatriate male working population in the private
sector is not significantly different; the median age of
the study population was 36 years old, similar to the
Ministry of Labour data average of 34 years old [26].
The percentage of expatriates under 30 years old in
the study sample was 22.2%, whereas the Ministry of
Labour reports around 21.3% of expatriates in the
same age bracket. The top six nationalities of expatri-
ate workers in the study correspond to the top six
nationalities of expatriate workers in the private sector of
the Riyadh region, as per the Ministry of Labour’s data-
base [26]. Due to the similarities between the sample size
and characteristics of expatriates’ population, we are
Table 5 Logistical Regression of uninsured expatriates based on
their personal and workplace characteristics
Marital status Odds
ratio
95.0% C.I. for
odds ratio
P-value
Upper Lower
Single (Reference)
Married without family in the Kingdom 1.03 1.4 0.77 0.565
Married with family in the Kingdom 0.71 0.96 0.53 0.026
Job educational requirement
Unskilled worker with no education (Reference)
Manual worker with less than high
school education
0.746 1.088 0.512 0.128
Technical with high school education 0.349 0.544 0.223 0.0001
Specialist with university education 0.292 0.459 0.186 0.0001
Number of employees in the company
<10 (Reference)
<25 0.81 1.7 0.39 0.583
<50 0.78 1.6 0.38 0.504
≥50 0.36 0.43 0.31 0.0001
Economic sector/business type
Agriculture (Reference)
Industrial/manufacturing 0.24 0.39 0.15 0.0001
Construction 0.15 0.25 0.098 0.0001
Trading 0.42 0.67 0.27 0.0001
Others 0.81 1.67 0.397 0.579
Income category
<2000 (reference)
2000 – 4500 0.85 1.1 0.66 0.066
4501 – 6000 0.44 0.53 0.37 0.018
6001 – 9000 0.512 0.812 0.323 0.004
>9000 0.245 0.328 0.183 0.0001
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confident that the sample used for the study is representa-
tive of the expatriate population.
Saudi Arabia, like other GCC member countries, has a
unique demographic composition in the private sector.
Expatriate workers comprise around 90% of the total man-
power in the private sector. Therefore, the burden of pro-
viding equitable access to health insurance for this group
needs to be carefully considered. Specifically, major influ-
ences on workers’ access to health insurance are the char-
acteristics of the potential recipients of the insurance and
the characteristics of the providers of the insurance.
The Saudi government’s regulations designed to re-
duce the percentage of uninsured expatriates may not
help to achieve its objectives. The regulations include
the enforcement of employers to provide insurance to
their expatriate workers and a unified health insurance
package, along with strong government intervention
through a Council and the imposition of penalties for
those who fail to follow the regulations. However, this
did not change the characteristics of expatriate employees
who were uninsured or the employers’ characteristics
because there are other influencing factors such as
under-development of the health insurance industry
in Saudi Arabia [3]. The health insurance companies
were the greatest source of complaints in healthcare
for the last eight years [30–36]. Also, there have been
reports of insurers providing fake insurance to em-
ployers acquiring residency visa renewal [23].
Similar to the characteristics of uninsured workers, as
documented elsewhere [37–42], the majority of unin-
sured expatriate workers in Saudi Arabia are young, sin-
gle and categorized as unskilled and usually uneducated.
More than two-thirds of expatriate workers are low in-
come and destitute people (see Table 2). The uninsured
population spans all age groups, but younger adults (19–
25 years) represent 30% of the uninsured, this could be
because they usually begin their careers in positions of-
fering relatively low incomes. Saudi Arabia is similar to
other countries, where the risk of being on a low income
means that not only is the employer more likely to offer
a job without health insurance but also that the pre-
mium is unlikely to be shared [43–45].
Studies from the United States, such as Monheit and
Vistnes [46], established that a firm’s size was not an in-
dicator of the health status of its employees but unin-
sured employees in both large and small firms are
predictably unhealthier than insured employees [46].
However, their finding is contentious as the outcome
could suggest health insurance was only offered to em-
ployees who were in good health [47]. Moreover, the
present study suggests that the health status of workers
in Saudi Arabia is not found to be a significant factor;
this is because expatriate workers undergo rigid medical
tests before deployment to their work site [48].
Furthermore, this study found that married expatriate
workers have better access to health insurance due to
the additional income earned by their partner. This find-
ing is supported by a study that found the health insur-
ance of married respondents was more related to total
income as the partner’s income augments the family in-
come [49]. Also, in Saudi Arabia, there are married ex-
patriates with professional jobs that allow employees to
bring their family with them (i.e. labour workers are not
eligible to be accompanied by their family) [50]. There-
fore, marital status could be reflecting job status and not
marital status.
Other studies have concluded that the higher the job
status and the greater the possibility employees will be
insured [51–54]. Moreover, research by Chatterjee and
Nielsen [55] found that there was no association be-
tween the education of expatriate workers and insurance
coverage [55]. However, these studies have not consid-
ered the distinction between the job and job education
requirements. Specifically, while education reflects the
personal characteristics of the employee, the job educa-
tion requirements reflect the importance of the job to
the employer. On this basis, we investigated job and
education requirements as one of the variables to assess
the complexity of the job, its importance to the em-
ployers and its influence on an expatriate employee’s ac-
cess to health insurance. Our study revealed a strong
relationship between job requirements and insurance
coverage regardless of expatriate workers’ actual educa-
tion. By implication, job skills and job requirements are
more important for Saudi employers when providing
health insurance coverage to expatriate employees. This
preferential treatment by Saudi employers in respect of
health insurance can be attributed to the government’s
policy of imposing conditions on the issuance of work
visas. The majority of expatriate workers change their
job status to ‘manual, labour’ jobs; while in their home
countries, they would be in the market for employment
requiring higher skills [56]. This disparity, between the
workers actual education and job requirements and its
influence on employers’ preference for providing health
insurance, has not hitherto been studied.
As shown by studies from other countries, small sized
companies are less likely to provide health insurance to
their workers [45, 49, 57, 58]. The same applies in Saudi
Arabia. Health insurance companies in Saudi Arabia
provide cover based on risk-pooling, similar to voluntary
health insurance, whereby insurers charge premiums in
relation to risk [3]. However, during the sixth stage, in
2008, when the CEBHI mandated insurance for all com-
panies, including those with less than fifty workers, in-
surance companies refused to participate unless their
premiums were increased by 200% [59]. This finding
was supported by other studies, which found, due to an
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increase in health insurance premiums, some companies
had either stopped providing health insurance to their em-
ployees or had changed the system, imposing all or most
of the contribution to their employees [60]. Also, one
study in Saudi Arabia found the increase in premiums
(due to high administrative costs) burdens and limits
participation by small employers in the scheme [3].
Our study’s findings, relating to the influence of the
economic sector on access to health insurance, are not
consistent with those from other studies. We found that
workers in the construction sector were more likely to
be insured than workers from other sectors. However,
findings from other studies suggest people in manufac-
turing jobs are more likely to be insured than other
sectors [39, 61]. This variance could be linked to the
competition among business sectors. For example, in the
United States there is competition between manufactur-
ing companies and, as a consequence, the employers
provide benefits to attract workers. Alternatively, in
Saudi Arabia, there is strong competition among con-
struction companies; accordingly, employers provide an
incentive package to attract workers, one of which is
health insurance coverage. Construction companies also
have difficulties acquiring foreign workers due to the
work visa constraints set by the government. In contrast,
construction companies are the largest employers by size
in Saudi Arabia, whereas the manufacturing sector is the
largest employer in the United States; therefore, these
companies can give better health insurance benefits with
a limited increase in the premium. Another study in the
region found that expatriates working in construction
are less likely to be insured [62]. However, this finding is
inconsistent with other studies in the region where it
was found that expatriates working in the construction
sector were less likely to be insured. Nevertheless, it is
worth noting that the study of Joshi and others did not
use quantitative methods to mediate the influence of
skill requirements for the job to perform the job or
workers’ education from the economic sector. However,
this study is consistent with other studies that show
workers from the agriculture sector are less likely to be
insured than those in other sectors [63].
There are other reported reasons for expatriate workers
not being insured. The main reason reported by more than
one-fourth (27.4%) of respondents was that insurance was
provided only to renew expatriate workers’ Iqama. Our
findings are supported by another study, which suggests
some employers pay insurers ‘under the table’ to renew
employees’ Iqamas when in fact the employees do not have
health insurance [23]. This finding supports evidence that
employers might play a major role in the provision of
health insurance for minorities in Asia [45, 57]. The source
of this behaviour could either be the employer as indicated
or the employees who buy their visas from their sponsors
(i.e. pay a monthly salary to their employers, to have free-
dom of movement) [56]. In both cases, there is supporting
evidence that self-employed workers are more likely to be
uninsured [39].
Our study found that the second most common reason
for expatriate workers being uninsured is that employees
are sponsored by different employers. These workers have
legal work permits but have either ‘run-away’ from their
sponsors (for various reasons) and are classified as un-
skilled with no education [29, 56], or work independently
from their employers (mainly small company employers),
who brought them to Saudi Arabia under an employer
sponsorship. The employer’s role, in this case, was only to
sign all legal papers of the expatriate workers [64] and
receive a monthly or annual payment from their now ‘in-
dependent employees’ for this service. These employers
are called labour brokers, and this service is another form
of labour brokering, in which a certain sponsor brings in
expatriate workers and rents them out to other companies
while workers stay under the sponsorship of the labour
broker. It would appear that the first form is more com-
mon in the Saudi labour market [64].
The third most common reason for expatriate workers
in Saudi Arabia being uninsured was that their visa was
for another job. These employees could either have illegal
residence status in Saudi Arabia or are self-employed with
a visa under a Saudi employer. The motivation behind this
is that some expatriate workers give money to Saudi citi-
zens to acquire visas, and pay a certain amount of money
annually as a gratuity for this service. This act is illegal.
There is evidence to suggest that the main incentive for
Saudis to do this is financial [65]. At the end of 2013, the
Saudi government undertook steps to rectify the labour
market of these “labour corrections” [66]. One of the main
objectives of these steps is to reduce the number of illegal
workers. Further studies may be required to assess the im-
pact of these steps to reduce uninsured expatriates.
There are some limitations to this study, one being
that the study only comprised male expatriates working
in the private sector; female expatriates and children
were excluded. However, if gender had been included as
one of the variables, it would have been very difficult to
obtain sufficient participants due to the small number of
female employees (98.30% of all expatriates in the pri-
vate sector are male) [1]. Also, most females working in
the private sector work in healthcare and all medical and
non-profit sectors were excluded from this study.
One source of potential bias is the fear by study partic-
ipants of recrimination from their employer, which could
have resulted in invalid responses. However, an official
letter and identification card from the research sponsor
were provided to reassure employees that all responses
would be for research purposes only, and the answers
would be treated with the utmost confidentiality. In
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addition, research assistants administering the survey
were selected from the same dominant nationalities and
languages of the private sector workers, thereby ensuring
that the survey could be understood and answered using
the participants’ language. Finally, the study is cross-
sectional, which may have increased bias with respect to
the time ordering of events.
Conclusions
Although the CEBHI seeks to mitigate some disadvantages
of the voluntary ESI by requiring employers to cover all
expatriate workers with unified benefits packages, there are
similarities in the characteristics of the uninsured between
CEBHI and other ESI schemes. Most of the literature dem-
onstrates size and competition in the market drive em-
ployers to provide fringe benefit packages, which includes
comprehensive health insurance coverage. In Saudi Arabia,
there is an additional constraint on the government’s pol-
icy, which limits work visas issued according to the type of
job. Along with the lack of local manpower sources, Saudi
employers are obliged to devise strategies to acquire and
retain expatriate workers, and they do this by offering at-
tractive employment incentive packages including health
insurance. However, this is true for only a select group of
expatriate workers depending on the employer’s needs and
criticality of the job in the company.
This study revealed that the size of the employer has a
substantial influence on expatriates’ access to health in-
surance. The premium of small size employers will be
critical to successful implementation of the CEBHI
scheme. The decision maker has to find a way to control
the high premiums for the small employers such as uni-
fying them in one single pool.
Since the study was undertaken, the CEBHI scheme
has been developed to include an expatriate worker’s
family or dependents. It is expected to worsen in the fu-
ture since children and women utilize health care ser-
vices more than men. A further study is needed to
determine the influence of this policy. Also, with the in-
clusion of expatriate worker`s family or dependents, it is
anticipated that health insurance premiums and health
care expenses will be higher than was the case when
they were for the worker alone.
The study has reveal that one of the reasons for not be-
ginning insured was due to the practice of obtaining insur-
ance just to meet the requirement for securing a residency
permit. This fact gives an indication to the policy maker of
the need to increase the solvency requirement for insur-
ance companies thereby increasing the viability of its in-
surance market and protecting consumers.
Endnotes
1The expatriate workers or migrant workers, as some-
times they are called, are categorized as minorities.
2The minimum benefit coverage is available at the
website of the Council of Cooperative Health Insurance
(CCHI): www.cchi.gov.sa.
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